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I. INTRODUCTION
Since Herman Lum became Chief Justice of the Hawaii Supreme
Court in 1983, the court has issued relatively few opinions dealing
with Native Hawaiian issues. Those few opinions may not be sufficient
to allow a fair assessment of the Lum Court's attitude toward Native
Hawaiian rights. Only five published decisions can be identified as
dealing with "purely" Native Hawaiian issues. The rest, while brought
by Hawaiians and affecting Native Hawaiian concerns are not strictly
Hawaiian rights cases. The few cases heard and determined by the
court indicate that the Lum Court is not receptive to Native Hawaiians
rights. Indeed, none of the cases expands or advances those rights.
With one important exception, Ahia v. Department of Transportation,'
all of the court's Native Hawaiian rights decisions have been rendered
by a unanimous court. Many of the decisions issued are in fact
memorandum opinions and have no precedential effect. These opinions
are discussed here because they mark a disturbing trend by the court
to issue memorandum opinions even where a published opinion could
clarify or develop the existing body of law.
II. THE NATIVE HAWAIIAN TRUSTS
Perhaps the clearest opportunity for the Lum Court to play a more
dynamic, but still judicially appropriate, role in recognizing Native
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1 69 Haw. 538, 751 P.2d 81 (1988) (Nakamura, J.).
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Hawaiian rights is in interpreting the two Native Hawaiian trusts-
the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust and the Public Land Trust. The
court's task in these instances would be merely to construe the appli-
cable statutes establishing the trusts consistent with the state's fiduciary
responsibility. The court's decisions, however, have been disappoint-
ingly conservative, merely confirming the status quo or worse.
A. The Hawaiian Home Lands Trust
In 1921, the United States Congress passed the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act (HHCA), 2 setting aside between 188,000 acres and
203,000 acres of public trust lands for homesteading by Native Ha-
waiians.' Under the HHCA, Native Hawaiians could obtain ninety-
nine year leases at the rate of a dollar per year, for residential, pastoral,
and agricultural lots. The HHCA also provided for services to assist
the beneficiaries with the establishment of these homesteads. Congress,
however, restricted eligibility for the program to Native Hawaiians of
fifty percent or more Hawaiian blood. Primary responsibility for ad-
ministration and management of the Hawaiian Homes program was
transferred to the State of Hawaii as a condition of statehood.4 The
program is now administered by a state agency, the Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands, whose executive board is the Hawaiian Homes
Commission. The federal government, however, still retains responsi-
bility for certain aspects of implementing the original act and Congress
has retained the power to amend the act.'
In 1985, the Hawaiian Homes Commission (Commission), leased
4.3 acres of Hawaiian Homes lands to the Department of Transpor-
tation (D.O.T.) for a public boat ramp at Kaulana, Kama'oa-Pu'u'eo,
Ka' for $10,575, or the construction of certain improvements designed
to accelerate homesteading in the area. Several beneficiaries challenged
the Commission's authority, under section 204 of the HHCA, to lease
the area to a public agency. Section 204(2) authorizes the Commission
2 42 Stat. 108 (1921), reprinted in I HAW. REV. STAT. at 167-205 (1985) (adopted
in the HAW. CONST. art. XII, S 1).
I See MELODY KAPILIALOHA MAcKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK
43-76 (1990), for a detailed analysis of the HHCA and its implementation.
Hawaii Admission Act 5§ 4, 5, 73 Stat. 4 (1959), reprinted in 1 HAW. REV. STAT.
at 86-89 (1985).
1 Id.; HHCA § 223, 42 Stat. 108 (1921), reprinted in 1 HAW. REV. STAT. at 167-
205 (1985).
1992 / NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS
to lease lands not required for homesteading to the public. The
beneficiaries contended that a government agency, such as the D.O.T.,
is not a member of the public within the meaning of section 204(2).
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Ahia v. Department of Transportation,
in a three-to-two decision, agreed with the Commission that section
204 allows such a disposition. 6 In a lengthy opinion, Justice Nakamura,
writing for the majority, determined that the elimination of the term
"general public" in an earlier version of section 204(2) and the
substitution of the term "public" indicated an intention by the legis-
lature to include government agencies.7 According to the majority, the
term "general public" refers to the people or community at large, but
does not include organized government. 8 The legislative committee
reports on the amendment indicated that one of its purposes was to
"grant the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (Department) full
authority to manage available Hawaiian home lands not required for
leasing[.]" 9 The committee reports, however, gave no reason for the
deletion of "the general public" and the substitution instead of "the
public."10 The court concluded, however:
In light of the stated purpose to invest the Commission with 'full
authority to manage retained available .. .lands,' we think the amend-
ment could only have been meant to dispel any notion that the Com-
mission was not vested with such authority, including the power to lease
to the government or its agencies 'available lands not required for leasing
[as homestead lands to beneficiaries]." 1
The majority opinion did not specifically address whether this dis-
position constituted a breach of the Commission's trust responsibility,
but given the court's handling of other issues raised by the beneficiaries,
it is unlikely that the majority would have found a breach of the trust.
For instance, the beneficiaries had asserted that the lands in question
were immediately needed for homesteading purposes. In disposing of
that issue, the majority recognized that the Kama'oa-Pu'u'eo lands
had never been leased to Native Hawaiians for homesteading, but
justified the Commission's decision to lease the lands to the D.O.T.
6 69 Haw. 538, 751 P.2d 81 (1988).
7 Id. at 548, 751 P.2d at 88.
Id. at 547, 751 P.2d at 88.
Id. at 547, 751 P.2d at 87 (citing SEN. STANDING COMM. REP. No. 600-76,
reprinted in 1976 HAW. SEN. J. 1141).
10 Id.
I Id.
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as one that would bring water to the area and make it possible to start
a homesteading program. 2
The minority opinion," written by Justice Padgett, with Justice
Hayashi concurring, addressed the breach of trust question. Under the
second paragraph of HHCA section 204(2), in giving a lease for
"commercial, industrial, or other business purposes" the Department
is required to give preference to Native Hawaiians. The appellants,
Native Hawaiian beneficiaries, had alleged that they were willing and
able to take the lease in question. The majority opinion rejected the
notion that the lease was for a commercial purpose. Justice Padgett
pointed out, however, that the two terms are not mutually exclusive;
a boat ramp may be used by the public but can also serve a commercial
purpose if fees are charged.' 4 The minority concluded that as long as
the lease had commercial as well as public aspects to it, the Commission
had a fiduciary responsibility to, at least, give consideration to making
the lease to beneficiaries. 5 Justice Padgett also took the Commission
and Department to task, reminding them that they, unlike other
government agencies, are held to higher fiduciary responsibilities in
dealing with beneficiaries. 16
The minority opinion then examined the construction of section
204(2). Another provision of HHCA, section 207(c), allows the De-
partment to grant utility easements and licenses for public purposes.
If section 204(2) can be read as giving the Department the authority
to lease lands for public purposes, then, Padgett argued, the provisions
of section 207(c) are "mere surplusage, devoid of any effect.' 17
Advocating a "holistic" approach, Justice Padgett concluded that
the HHCA contains a "complete framework for dealing with the trust
lands."'" This framework allows the Commission to make certain
dispositions for public purposes and, with restrictions, to make leases
to the public. It does not, in the minority's judgment, grant the
Commission the unrestricted power to make leases for public purposes
to other government agencies. ' 9 Justice Padgett, in an important foot-
12 Id. at 550, 751 P.2d at 89.
13 Id. at 552, 751 P.2d at 89 (Padgett, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 553, 751 P.2d at 90.
IS Id. at 554, 751 P.2d at 91.
,6 Id. at 553, 751 P.2d at 91.
17 Id. at 556, 751 P.2d at 92.
8 Id. at 557, 751 P.2d at 93.
19 Id. at 557-58, 751 P.2d at 93.
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note, recognized that his construction of the HHCA would require
legislative action to validate certain dispositions of trust lands made by
the Department. He concluded, however,
[I]f there is to be a power, in the Department, to turn over trust lands
to other government agencies, it should be as a result of express language
enacted by the legislature and approved by Congress with a full public
debate on the desirability and the terms thereof. We owe the trust and
its Native Hawaiian beneficiaries no less.
20
In another case involving a dispute between the Department of
Hawaiian Home Lands and an individual lessee, Justice Padgett,
writing for a unanimous court, held that a special proceeding instituted
by the Hawaiian Homes Commission to enforce a decision to terminate
a homestead lease was a civil action which, under Rule 4 of the Hawaii
Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the service of a summons and allows
the defendant twenty days to answer. In In re Smith,21 a Native Hawaiian
homesteader who had been loaned $25,000 by the Commission for
construction of his home, withheld payments because of defective
electrical wiring done by the contractor, who had been contracted by
the Commission to build the house. 22 No summons to Smith was issued
by the circuit court and Smith was not given an opportunity to respond
as required by Rule 4. 21
The supreme court held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
enter a judgment granting the Hawaiian Homes Commission's petition
to recover Smith's leasehold and ordering Smith to vacate the leasehold.
The court found that the Commission's procedure of filing a special
proceeding to ask the circuit court to enforce a "Writ of Assistance"
was not cognizable under any court rules and the entire' proceeding
violated Smith's due process' rights. 24
The Smith decision is the only published opinion in which the Lum
Court has unanimously supported the rights of a Native Hawaiian
individual or organization. The court may have been influenced by
the equities of the situation-Smith was not able to get insurance for
his home because of the wiring deficiencies, the Commission had not
required the contractor to correct the deficiencies, and Smith had been
20 Id. at 558 n.1, 751 P.2d at 93 n.1.
21 68 Haw. 466, 719 P.2d 397 (1986) (Padgett, J.).
22 Id. at 467, 719 P.2d at 399.
23 Id. at 469, 719 P.2d at 400.
14 Id. at 471, 719 P.2d at 401.
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making his payments into an informal escrow account. Moreover, the
court did not treat the case as a native rights case but analyzed it
merely as a violation of individual due process rights.
B. The Public Land Trust
The Hawaii Supreme Court, in Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
v. Yamasaki,25 based its ruling on the "political question" doctrine and
refused to determine two important questions on entitlements to the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs from the public land trust.
The public land trust originates in language found in the Joint
Resolution of Annexation 26 ceding Hawai'i's sovereignty and conveying
about 1.7 million acres of Government and Crown Lands to the United
States. The resolution provided that existing laws of the United States
relative to public lands would not be applicable to Hawai'i. Another
provision of the joint resolution stated that "all revenues from or
proceeds of [the public lands] . . . shall be used solely for the benefit
of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other
public purposes. "27
The 1900 Organic Act establishing Hawai'i's territorial government
provided that the public lands, with certain exceptions, would remain
in the possession, use, and control of the Territory. 28 Another provision
of the Organic Act stated that the proceeds from the territory's sale,
lease, or other disposition of these ceded lands should be deposited in
the territory's treasury for "such uses and purposes for the benefit of
the inhabitants of the Territory of Hawaii as are consistent with the
Joint Resolution of Annexation. "29
Upon statehood, the public lands (the former Government and
Crown lands) were returned to the state as a public trust. Section 5(f)
of Hawai'i's Admission Act states that the lands, and income and
23 69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446 (1987) (Nakamura, J.).
26 Joint Resolution of Annexation of July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750 (1898).
27 Id. A U.S. Attorney General's Opinion characterized the joint resolution's
provision: "The effect of [the language] was to subject the public lands in Hawaii to
a special trust, limiting the revenue from or proceeds of the same to the uses of the
inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for education or other purposes." 22 Op. ATr'v
GEN. 574 (1899).
28 Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, S 91, 31 Stat. 141 (1900).
29 Id. § 73(4)(e).
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proceeds from the sale or other disposition of the lands, shall be held
by the state as a public trust for five trust purposes, including the
betterment of the conditions of Native Hawaiians, as defined in the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as amended."
Prior to 1978, the state had interpreted the section 5(f) provision to
require that the proceeds and income from the public land trust be
used for the fulfillment of any one of the five trust purposes and the
state chose to make that one purpose public education. At the 1978
Constitutional Convention, however, the Hawaiian Affairs Committee
sought to clarify and implement the Admission Act's trust language
relative to Native Hawaiians. As a result, three new sections were
added to the state constitution fundamentally altering the state's role
in implementing the section 5(o trust language. Article XII, section 4
specified that the lands in the public land trust (with the exception of
the Hawaiian Home Lands) are held by the state as a public trust for
Native Hawaiians and the general public. Article XII, section 5 estab-
lished an Office of Hawaiian Affairs (O.H.A.) to be governed by a
nine-member board of trustees, which would hold title for the benefit
of Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians to all real or personal property,
set aside or conveyed to it. Article XII, section 6 set forth the powers
of the O.H.A. board of trustees and made it clear that a pro rata
portion of the income and proceeds from sale or other disposition of
the public land trust was included within the property that O.H.A.
was to hold in trust.
The Constitution did not specify, however, what O.H.A.'s pro rata
share would be. In 1980, the state legislature set the amount to be
received by O.H.A. from the proceeds and income generated by the
public land trust at twenty percent.3 However, many issues relating
to the public land trust and its proceeds and income remained. Disputes
over whether specific parcels of land were part of the trust, questions
as to whether "income" meant gross or net income, and problems in
defining "proceeds" plagued O.H.A. and hampered it in carrying out
its responsibilities to Native Hawaiians.
It was against this background that Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs v. Yamasaki12 was decided. O.H.A. Trustees filed two separate
suits. The first suit, brought against the Attorney General, the Chair
50 Hawaii Admission Act S 5(0, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
3I Act 273, 10th Leg., 2nd Sess., 1980 Haw. Sess. L. 525 (codified in HAW. REv.
STAT. § 10-13.5 (1980)).
12 69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446 (1987).
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of the Board of Land and Natural Resources, and the Director of
Finance, in their official capacities, sought a declaration that O.H.A.
was entitled to twenty percent of the damages received by the state in
settlement of a lawsuit for the illegal mining of sand from Pohaku
Beach, ceded lands, on Moloka'i. 3 The state had received land from
Molokai Ranch valued at $1,279,006 as damages in the suit.3 4 O.H.A.
alleged that it was entitled to receive an undivided twenty percent
interest in the land or a cash amount equal to twenty percent of the
appraised value of the land.3 5 The Trustees also sought mandatory
relief to enforce the judgment.3 6
The second suit, brought against the Director of Transportation and
the Aloha Tower Development Corporation, sought a declaration that
O.H.A. was entitled to twenty percent of the income and the proceeds
from sales, leases, or other disposition of lands surrounding harbors
on all the major islands, land on Sand Island, land on which Honolulu
International Airport is located, and land on which the Aloha Tower
Complex stands.3 7
The state moved to dismiss the actions contending that O.H.A.
lacked standing to sue and the suits were barred by sovereign immu-
nity.3 8 After consolidation for hearing, the circuit court denied the
state's motions but granted leave to seek interlocutory appellate re-
view.3 9 State officials appealed. The Hawaii Supreme Court declined
to rule on the sovereign immunity or standing questions stating that,
after examining the facts, they found the issues "to be of a peculiarly
political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination. '"40
With regard to the questions raised in the first action, the court
stated:
Nothing in [Hawaii Revised Statute] § 10.5, where the public land trust
is described, serves as statutory base for a ruling that such damages are
funds derived from the public land trust or that a pro rata portion of
11 Id. at 165-66, 737 P.2d at 453.
Id. at 166 n.14, 737 P.2d at 453 n.14.
35 Id. at 166, 737 P.2d at 453.
3 Id.
17 Id.
38 Id. at 167, 737 P.2d at 454.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 175, 737 P.2d at 458 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552
(1946)).
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the land conveyed to the State in lieu of the damages should in turn be
conveyed to the Trustees of OHA. Either ruling would be rendered
possible only by an initial policy determination by the court of a kind
normally reserved for nonjudicial discretion.4 1
In looking at the second case, the court was influenced by the fact
that the state had already made commitments for the revenues from
the harbors and airports. 42 Construction of the state's harbors and
airports is financed through bond sales and a state guarantee that
revenues obtained from the operation of these facilities will be used to
repay bondholders. The court concluded:
Were the circuit court to enjoin the Director of Transportation as prayed
by the Trustees, he would be compelled to renege on the State's pledge.
It would be unrealistic, to say the least, for us to conclude this could
have been the intent of the legislature when the language of [Hawaii
Revised Statute section] 10-13.5 was adopted. 43
Moreover, the court appeared to believe that even when O.H.A.'s
share of the public lands trust fund was fixed at twenty percent by the
state legislature, the trust res was undetermined. The court found
evidence of this in the act authorizing the legislative auditor to complete
the inventory of ceded lands and study the use and distribution of
revenues from ceded lands. The court noted that all four committees
to which the measure was referred found there were uncertainties with
respect to ceded lands comprising the trust and the funds derived
therefrom." The court also noted that the Legislative Auditor's Final
Report of December 1986 stated that the uncertainties surrounding the
trust and funds derived therefrom could not be resolved without further
legislative action.4 5 Consequently, the court, following the lead of the
Legislative Auditor, concluded that the issues were better left for
resolution by the legislature than the judiciary.4
Two and half years later, the O.H.A. Trustees and Governor Waihee
announced a settlement of the ceded lands dispute, which was ultimately
approved by the legislature. 47
4 Id. at 174-75, 737 P.2d at 458.
12 Id. at 175, 737 P.2d at 458.
4 Id.
Id. at 173, 737 P.2d at 457.
41 Id. at 174, 737 P.2d at 457-58.
' Id. In October 1987, the United States Supreme Court declined to review the
Yamasaki decision. 484 U.S. 898 (1987) (denying certiorari).
*7 Under the terms of the settlement, approved by the 1990 Legislature as Act 304,
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In 1991, the relationship between individual Native Hawaiians and
the public trust lands under the Aloha Tower Development Complex
was reviewed by the court. In Kaapu v. Aloha Tower Development Cor-
poration,4 Kekoa Kaapu challenged the procedures used by the Aloha
Tower Development Corporation to select a developer for the Aloha
Tower complex. After filing a lawsuit for injunctive relief, Kaapu filed
a notice of pendency of action at the bureau of conveyances. The trial
court subsequently granted an order expunging the notice. On review-
ing that order, the supreme court examined the lis pendens statute and
the property interest it was designed to protect. Kaapu claimed an
interest in the land because as a Hawaiian or Native Hawaiian, he
had a "recognized, though unsettled, interest in ceded lands which
underlie much of the 'Aloha Tower' project area . . . . ,,49 In deter-
mining whether that interest was sufficient to give Kaapu standing to
file a notice of lis pendens, the court inferred that an individual Native
both the trust corpus and trust revenues have been defined. Act 304 provides that all
Hawaii Admission Act section 5(b), 5(e), and Pub. L. No. 88-233 lands, with the
exception of Hawaiian Homes trust lands, are subject to the trust, regardless of
departmental jurisdiction. This means that all lands in these categories, whether
administered by the Department of Land and Natural Resources, D.O.T., or any
other state department, are subject to the O.H.A. entitlement.
Revenues have been segregated into two categories-sovereign and proprietary
income.
Sovereign income is the income which the state generates as an exercise of govern-
mental or sovereign power. This income is not subject to the O.H.A. trust provision.
Among the revenues included in the sovereign category are personal and corporate
income taxes, general excise taxes, fines collected for violations of state law, and
federal grants or subsidies.
Proprietary income is the income generated from the use or disposition of the public
trust lands. Included in this category are rents, leases, and licenses for the use of trust
lands, minerals, and runway landing fees. Proprietary income is subject to the O.H.A.
trust provision.
The settlement also sets forth specific guidelines for determining amounts due for
previous years including the use of the sovereign and proprietary income categories to
segregate income generated on trust lands calculated from the effective date of the 20
percent formula (June 16, 1980) and payment of the allowed statutory interest
compounded annually on the actual amounts due. After all the calculations have been
made and the total amounts due for previous years are determined, the trustees and
governor have agreed that O.H.A. may take amounts due for previous years in the
form of money, land, or a combination of money and land. While the exact amounts
are still being calculated, it is estimated that O.H.A. will be entitled to an additional
$7-8 million a year as a result of the settlement.
Act 304, 15th Leg., 2nd Sess., 1990 Haw. Sess. L. 947.
48 72 Haw. 267, 814 P.2d 396 (1991).
49 Id. at 268, 814 P.2d at 397.
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Hawaiian's interest in lands under the Aloha Tower Development
could be no greater than that given to the O.H.A. by statute. Under
applicable statutes, O.H.A. merely has a right to a percentage income
from the development of the lands, it does not have a claim to title or
control over the use or development of the land. Consequently, the
court concluded, "[i]f the trustees [of O.H.A.] have no more than that
power, then appellant has no more than that power. . . . [Kaapu's]
remedy may lie in seeking injunctive relief, which [he] has done;
however, he is not entitled to place a cloud on the subject property."5
More recently, the supreme court issued a memorandum opinion in
a case alleging a breach of O.H.A.'s fiduciary duties. In Kepoo v.
Burgess,51 four Hawaiians and Native Hawaiians challenged O.H.A.'s
authority to use section 5(f) funds to conduct a referendum on the
whether the blood quantum distinction between "Hawaiians" and
"Native Hawaiians" should be eliminated. 2 Appellants alleged a breach
of fiduciary duty in that the O.H.A. Trustees advocated a single
definition of "Native Hawaiian" as one with any amount of Hawaiian
blood and expended trust funds to inform and educate the Hawaiian
community about the single definition referendum.
The circuit court had granted O.H.A.'s summary judgment motion,
finding that: "The betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians
can be achieved in many ways. Programs such as the single definition
referendum that promote self-definition is one of the many ways to
achieve the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians even
though all Hawaiians would benefit.' ' 3 The supreme court found no
reversible error and summarily affirmed.5
The authority of the O.H.A. trustees to use section 5(f) funds for
various activities has been raised previously55 and undoubtedly will be
raised again. The supreme court could have used the Kepoo case to
50 Id. at 270, 814 P.2d at 398.
1' S. Ct. No. 14770 (June 25, 1991).
52 A "Native Hawaiian" as defined in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, and
applicable federal and state law dealing with the public land trust, is one with not less
than fifty per cent Hawaiian blood. A "Hawaiian" is one with any percentage of
Hawaiian blood. HAW. REV. STAT. S 10-2 (Supp. 1991).
53 Kepoo v. Burgess, Civ. No. 88-2987-09, (Haw. 1st Cir.) (summary judgment
granted Aug. 28, 1990).
S. Ct. No. 14770 (June 25, 1991).
55 See Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1990).
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give guidance to the trustees and beneficiaries on the authorized uses
of trust funds. It chose not to do so. Moreover, in the Kepoo decision,
the supreme court noted its
disagreement with [the O.H.A. trustees'] assertion that the legislature
may alter the intended purposes of the section 5(f) public trust. In
creating the section 5(f) public trust, Congress directed that all proceeds
of the trust were to be used for 'one or more' of five statutory pur-
poses. . . . We therefore believe that the statutory purposes of the section
5(f) trust may not be changed without Congressional approval. '"56
If indeed, as the memorandum opinion indicates, O.H.A. raised the
argument that the state could change the trust purposes established in
section 5(f) of the Admission Act, then the court should have published
an opinion dispelling that notion, rather than merely allude to it in a
decision lacking precedential effect.
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
In State v. Lono,57 members of the Temple of Lono were arrested
and charged with camping without a permit at Kualoa Regional Park.
Kualoa is a sacred site and the location of an ancient heiau dedicated
to Lono. Park regulations did not allow extended camping periods,
and Temple members had entered and remained in the park for periods
from three weeks to four months in order to perform various cere-
monies. One of the religious practices involved sitting in a meditative
state until experiencing h 'ike a ka p or night visions, providing inspi-
ration and guidance. In their defense, Temple members challenged the
park regulation as an infringement upon religious freedom. The trial
court determined that defendants "religious interest in participating in
dreams at Kualoa Regional Park are not indispensable to the Hawaiian
religious practices, and further the Defendants' practices in exercising
their religious beliefs . . . are philosophical and personal and therefore
not entitled to First Amendment protection.' '58 The Hawaii Supreme
Court also gave short shrift to the religious freedom argument, affirming
the trial court in a memorandum opinion.5 9
'6 S. Ct. No. 14770 (June 25, 1991) at 2.
11 S. Ct. No. 9571 (Apr. 3, 1985).
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss at 4, State v. Lono, Case Nos. CTR 1-21
(Sept. 2, 1982); CTR 1-26 (Sept. 9, 1982); CTR 22 (Sept. 10, 1982); and CTR 5-8
(Oct. 1, 1982).
59 67 Haw. 679 (S. Ct. No. 9571, Apr. 3, 1985).
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In the only published opinion dealing with the exercise of Native
Hawaiian religion, Dedman v. Board of Land and Natural Resources,60 the
Hawaii Supreme Court applied the test adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 1 In Yoder, members of the Amish
sect refused to permit their children to continue formal education
beyond the eighth grade. The Amish valued and practiced agricultural
work and feared higher education would endanger their children's
salvation. Their refusal to allow their children to attend school, how-
ever, violated Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance laws. The
Supreme Court reviewed the burden imposed by the school attendance
law on Amish religion. The Court then held that the state's interest
in education was sufficiently compelling to overcome the Free Exercise
Clause protection of Amish religious practices.
61
In Dedman, Native Hawaiians challenged a Board of Land and
Natural Resources' (B.L.N.R.) decision permitting geothermal devel-
opment in an the Wao Kele '0 Puna rainforest, an area significant to
native religious practitioners who honor the deity Pele.63 The Pele
practitioners claimed that the proposed development would impinge on
their right to free religious exercise, since geothermal development
requires drilling into the body of Pele and taking her energy and
lifeblood. 64
The Hawaii Supreme Court first acknowledged the sincerity of the
religious claims at issue. 65 It then considered whether the B.L.N.R.'s
approval of the proposed geothermal development would unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon Native Hawaiian religious practice. 66 On this
question, the court found controlling the absence of proof that religious
ceremonies were held in the area proposed for development. 67 Without
evidence of a burden on the free exercise of native religion, the court
did not reach the compelling state interest question. Accordingly, the
60 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988).
61 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62 Id. at 234.
63 Dedman v. Bd. of Land and Natural Resources, 69 Haw. 255, 256, 740 P.2d
28, 31 (1987) (Lum, C.J.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988).
64 Id. at 259-260, 740 P.2d at 32. According to Native Hawaiian religious belief,
the area proposed for geothermal development is considered the home of Pele, the
volcano goddess.
65 Id. at 260, 740 P.2d at 32.
" Id.
67 Id. at 261, 740 P.2d at 33.
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court concluded that no Free Exercise Clause violation had occurred. 6
The Lum Court's application of a narrow analysis of free exercise
infringement accounted for its failure to find any burden on Native
Hawaiian religious practices. Under the court's view, a burden on the
free exercise of religion exists when government action regulates or
directly impinges on Native Hawaiian religious practices. Furthermore,
only government conduct which compelled irreverence of religious
beliefs or penalized individuals for their religious actions would warrant
free exercise protection. Certainly, few native religious practitioners
could meet this standard.
Any doubt concerning the Hawaii Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis of free exercise protection dissolved with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association69 and its subsequent refusal to review the Dedman decision.7 °
Lyng reinforces the limited interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
advanced in Dedman and thereby places the unfettered practice of Native
Hawaiian religion at serious risk. Moreover, the distinctiveness of
Native Hawaiian religion, markedly different from traditional Judeo-
Christian doctrines, makes it especially vulnerable and renders its
continued protection under the Free Exercise Clause elusive.
In the Dedman case, the state constitutional amendment protecting
traditional and customary rights of Native Hawaiian ahupua'a tenants
was not specifically implicated. This may have been because those
challenging the B.L.N.R. action did not claim to live within the
ahupua'a where the land was located nor to have such rights. Thus,
the Hawai'i courts have never interpreted this constitutional amend-
ment in the context of a religious freedom claim.7 However, given the
fact that the Hawaii Supreme Court in Dedman failed to give any
greater protection to native religious practitioners under Hawai'i's own
constitutional religious freedom provision,72 it would appear unlikely
61 Id. at 261-62, 740 P.2d at 32-33.
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
485 U.S. 1020 (1988) (denying cert. for Dedman, 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28
(1987)).
" But see Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 11-12, 656 P.2d 745, 751-52
(1982) (finding that HAW. REv. STAT. 5 1-1 may be used as a vehicle for the continued
existence of those commoner's rights which continue to be practiced and cause no
harm to the interests of others).
712 HAW. CONST. art. I, S 4 reads, in part: "No law shall be enacted respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ."
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that the Lum Court would be sympathetic to an argument based on
ahupua'a tenant rights.
Most recently, the Hawaii Supreme Court has reviewed a group of
trespass convictions arising out of Hawaiian protests over geothermal
development in the Wao Kele '0 Puna rainforest. In a series of
memorandum opinions" issued in the fall of 1991, the court gave little
credence to arguments that the geothermal developer violated the
defendants' free exercise of religion by prohibiting access to the devel-
opment site. The defendants wished to conduct a religious ceremony
at the site to heal damage to Pele caused by geothermal drilling. In
State v. McGregor,74 the most detailed of the memorandum opinions, the
court examined whether there was a sufficiently close nexus between
the state and the challenged action, in this case prohibiting McGregor
from entering the geothermal well site area to conduct a religious
ceremony. If such a nexus existed, then the action of the geothermal
developer could be treated as an action of the state itself.7 Not
surprisingly, the court found that the defendant had not met her
burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the state
directed, encouraged, or supported the private developer in prohibiting
access to the geothermal drill site.76 The court thus determined that
there was no state action and that McGregor's arrest for trespassing
did not violate her free exercise of religion."
IV. HAWAIIAN CUSTOMARY ADOPTIoN-HANAI
Adoption comprised an integral part of ancient Hawaiian life and
customary adoption continues to exist even today. Perhaps the most
generally recognized form of adoption is hanai, meaning "to feed."
Hanai refers to a child who is reared, educated, and loved by someone
other than the natural parents. The h'anai relationship occurs most often
within the family, so the child is rarely raised by strangers. Tradition-
" State v. Lee, S. Ct. No. 14984 (Oct. 15, 1991); State v. Kanahele, S. Ct. No.
15069 (Oct. 15, 1991); State v. Lee, S. Ct. No. 14874 (Oct. 16, 1991); State v.
Luning, S. Ct. No. 15063, State v. Eaton, S. Ct. No. 15279, State v. Kaipo, S. Ct.
No. 15280, State v. Kaleiwahea, S. Ct. No. 15281, State v. Dedman, S. Ct. No.
15092 (Dec. 18, 1991).
7 S. Ct. No. 14985 (Sept. 26, 1991).
" Id. at 3.
16 Id. at 4.
7 Id.
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ally, the permanent quality of the h'anai relationship made it a near
equivalent of legal adoption. However, early Hawai'i cases recognized
that not all /iznai relationships carried with them the right to inherit
property. In 1841, the Hawaii Legislature adopted its first written law
of adoption and subsequently, Hawai'i's courts refused to give legal
recognition to lanai or other customary adoptions unless the statutory
.adoption procedures had been followed.
Today, Hawai'i's courts continue to distinguish between legal adop-
tion and h/nai relationships. In an opinion written by Justice Padgett
in Maui Land and Pineapple Co. v. Naiapaakai Heirs of John Keola Makee-
lani,78 the Hawaii Supreme Court refused to reconsider the case law
surrounding customary adoption. In that case, the h-nai children of
John Keola claimed an interest in his property based on customary
adoption. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated:
[W]hile adoption by custom was recognized in early times beginning in
1841 and continuing until the present time (and thus in effect during
the period when appellants were hanaied by John Keola), there were
written statutes of adoption which had to be followed in order to
constitute the adoptee's legal heirs of the adopters. Even prior to the
enactment of any statutes on the subject of adoption, the mere fact that
one was a "keiki hanai" did not, by Hawaiian custom, carry with it a
right of inheritance.79
The appellants had argued that the court should adopt the doctrine
of equitable adoption, which had been used in Alaska to uphold Alaskan
Native cultural adoptions with attendant inheritance rights.80 In the
Alaska case, the Alaska Supreme Court had placed great emphasis on
differences between the Anglo-American judicial system and the tra-
ditional Alaska Native practices and the cultural difficulties experienced
by Alaska Natives in dealing with the Anglo-American judicial system.
The Alaska court held that equitable adoption, in which the factual
circumstances of each case are examined to determine whether there
was an intent to adopt, "is an appropriate vehicle which can be utilized
in intestate succession cases to avoid hardship created in part by the
" 69 Haw. 565, 751 P.2d 1020 (1988) (Padgett, J.).
19 Id. at 568, 751 P.2d at 1021-22.
10 Calista Corporation v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977) (applying the equitable
adoption doctrine to allow two native Alaskan women who had been adopted in the
culturally accepted manner of their tribes to receive shares of stock in their parents'
native corporations organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act).
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diversity of cultures found within this jurisdiction." '8' The Hawaii
Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to accord any significance to
the difficulties experienced by Native Hawaiians in confronting the
differences between Hawaiian cultural practices and the Western ju-
dicial system.8 2
V. CONCLUSION
The Native Hawaiian rights cases decided by the Hawaii Supreme
Court since 1983 appear to fall into a pattern which can be characterized
as a fidelity to established precedent and an avoidance of "hard"
issues.
Both Dedman83 and the Naaiapaakai8 decision on customary adoption
demonstrate the Lur Court's adherence to established precedent. The
court has not ventured beyond the status quo. It has consistently
declined the opportunity to expand the law and give recognition to the
unique cultural and religious claims of Native Hawaiians. Even in Ahia
v. Department of Transportation,8 5 where the court could have stayed well
within precedent and ruled, as urged by the minority, on the breach
of trust issue, the majority chose to rest its decision on a strained and
questionable reading of the H.H.C.A.
The court's tendency to avoid "hard" issues is exemplified by the
OHA v. Yamasak' 6 decision. In Yamasaki, the court sua sponte ruled on
the basis of the political question doctrine, a doctrine that had never
been raised or argued by the state. Indeed, the only questions before
the supreme court in Yamasaki were O.H.A.'s standing to bring suit
and whether sovereign immunity could be asserted by one arm of the
state against another arm of the state. These initial issues could have
been determined by the court and the cases returned to the circuit
court for further proceedings which might have, given the opportunity,
, Id. at 61-62.
02 Contrast the Naiapaakai case with the supreme court's decision in Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (allowing a recovery for emotional
distress caused by seeing a step-grandmother hit by a car). The Leong case shows a
willingness by the Court at that time to recognize the diversity of cultural practices
in Hawai'i. Id. at 410-11, 520 P.2d at 766.
8 69 Haw. 255, 740 P.2d 28 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1020 (1988); see supra
part III for a discussion of Dedman.
69 Haw. 565, 751 P.2d 1020 (1988); see supra part IV for a discussion of
Naiapaakai.
83 69 Haw. 538, 751 P.2d 81 (1988); see supra part II.A. for discussion of Ahia.
6 69 Haw. 154, 737 P.2d 446 (1987); see supra part II.B. for discussion of Yamasaki.
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clarified the legislature's intent in enacting the O.H.A. entitlement
provision.
Finally, this article has cited numerous cases which have been decided
by the supreme court in memorandum opinions. While there may be
many justifiable reasons, including judicial efficiency, for issuing mem-
orandum opinions, the court should not ignore the need of the legal
community and, indeed, the community at large, for judicial guidance.
Will questions that have been raised on appeal be argued again and
again because of the court's reluctance to issue published and precedent
setting opinions? What are the costs to litigants and the public by
relitigating principles previously decided by the court in memorandum
opinions? More importantly, is the court, by its silence, abdicating its
role to create and guide the development of our common law? These
are difficult and troubling questions not only for Native Hawaiians,
but for Hawai'i as a whole.
